Naxalism: Causes, Current Status, and Development Response
July 19, 2026
Naxalism: Causes, Current Status, and Development Response
Introduction
Naxalism — also called Left Wing Extremism (LWE) or Maoist insurgency — is India's longest-running internal security challenge. Originating from a peasant uprising in Naxalbari, West Bengal (1967), it has evolved through multiple phases and remains active in a shrinking but persistent set of districts. The movement claims to fight for land rights, tribal autonomy, and against exploitation, using armed guerrilla warfare.
Historical Evolution
Phase I — The Naxalbari Uprising (1967–1972)
March 1967: Peasant uprising in Naxalbari village, Darjeeling district, West Bengal. Led by local CPI(M) leaders Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal.
Issue: Eviction of tribal sharecroppers (adhiars) from agricultural land. Armed attack on landlords and police.
Political context: Split in CPI(M). Charu Mazumdar founded Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) — CPI(ML) in 1968.
Slogan: "Spring Thunder over Naxalbari" (Peking Review, July 1967).
Suppression: Violent state response; by 1972, the leadership was killed, arrested, or went underground.
Phase II — Splintering and Spread (1972–2000)
Ideological fragmentation — CPI(ML) split into dozens of factions: CPI(ML) Liberation, Party Unity, MCC (Maoist Communist Centre), CPI(ML) People's War.
Base shift — From Bengal to Bihar (Aurangabad, Gaya), Andhra Pradesh (Telangana region, Dandakaranya forests), Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Maharashtra.
Emergence of the 'Area of Darkness' — The 'Red Corridor' (80-90 districts across central and eastern India) where LWE has presence.
Tactical shift — From sporadic peasant attacks to sustained guerrilla war: targeted killings of police informers, landmine attacks, ambushes.
Phase III — Unified Maoist Movement (2004–Present)
2004: Merger of CPI(ML) People's War and MCC into Communist Party of India (Maoist). Formation of People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA).
2005: Declared a 'terrorist organisation' under UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act).
2009: Launch of Operation Green Hunt — coordinated central-state counter-insurgency campaign.
2010: Major attacks — Dantewada (76 CRPF killed), Silda (24 Bn killed), Jnarkhand. Peak of violence.
2013: Chhattisgarh attack on Congress convoy (27 killed, including Mahendra Karma [founder of Salwa Judum], Vidya Charan Shukla).
2021-2024: Significant operational decline; but the movement adapts through urban networks, legal cells.
Land inequality — Tribal communities (Scheduled Tribes) dispossessed of forest land by state policies and private interests. Despite Forest Rights Act (2006), implementation is poor.
Underdevelopment — LWE districts have among India's lowest Human Development Index (HDI) values: poor education, health, infrastructure, banking connectivity.
Tribal exploitation — Money lenders (sahukars) and traders exploit tribal populations. Land alienation through illegal transfers.
Resource curse — Dense mineral-rich areas (iron ore, bauxite, coal) in LWE regions (Bastar, Singhbhum, Keonjhar). Mining displaces tribals; benefits do not reach them.
Political/Governance Causes
Weak state presence — Remote villages lack police stations, courts, banks, health Sub-Centres. State is either absent or oppressive.
Police brutality and corruption — Extortion by local police, false encounters, custodial violence — driving youth into Maoist arms.
Collapse of constitutional institutions — Gram Sabhas not empowered; PESA (Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act, 1996) not implemented effectively.
Failure of land reforms — Land ceiling acts bypassed; unrecorded tenancy continues.
Proximate Triggers
Grievance framework — Maoists provide 'quick justice' (kangaroo courts) against landlords or police informers, creating dependency.
Recruitment appeal — Ideology of anti-capitalism, anti-globalisation; tribal youth with no other avenue find purpose, salary (PLGA pays ~₹10,000/month — better than any available job).
Sanctuary terrain — Dense forests of Dandakaranya, Abujhmarh, Saranda provide tactical refuge.
Current Status (as of 2026)
Geographical Spread
Core LWE districts: Declined from 106 districts (2009) to ~25-30 districts (2025). Chhattisgarh accounts for ~60% of all LWE violence.
2025-26: Further contraction but Chhattisgarh remains hard zone; 2-3 major ambushes per year.
Government Response
Security Response
Operation Green Hunt (2009) — Sustained counter-insurgency involving CAPFs (CRPF, ITBP) and state police (Chhattisgarh Police). 18,000+ central forces deployed.
Surrender policy — Rehabilitation packages: ₹4-5 lakh cash, vocational training, housing under PMAY, education for children.
Special forces — CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) — 10 battalions of CRPF specialised in jungle warfare.
Greyhounds (Andhra/Telangana) — Elite anti-Naxal police force (considered most effective).
District Reserve Guard (DRG) — Local tribal youth recruited as police — weakening Maoist recruitment.
Developmental Response
SAMADHAN Doctrine (2015, MHA) — Smart leadership, Administrative reforms, Media, Actionable intelligence, Development, Harmony, Analysis of trends, New technology.
ASP (Aspirational Districts Programme) — 115 most backward districts targeted for rapid development. 111 of these were LWE-affected. Improved outcomes in education, health, infrastructure.
FRAs (Forest Rights Act 2006) — Recognition of individual and community forest rights — addresses tribal grievance.
Road connectivity — 2,300+ km of roads built in LWE areas under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) special plan.
Banking and telecom — Banking Correspondents (BC Sakhi), mobile towers in remote areas.
PESA Act (1996) — Still poorly implemented; recognition of Gram Sabha authority is key.
Social Countermeasures
Nikal-Kaal Abhiyan (Chhattisgarh) — Village campaigns encouraging Maoist families to bring back young cadres.
Maoist surrender incentive — Starting new life: livelihood training, bank loans, identity documents (often long-term Naxals lack Aadhaar).
Community policing — Van Rakshaks, Village Defence Committees (often controversial — former Salwa Judum had human rights concerns; volunteer model reformed since).
Criticisms and Challenges
Human rights violations — CRPF excesses, custodial deaths, extrajudicial killings in 'encounters'. Supreme Court monitored.
False surrenders — Some returnees rejoin Maoist ranks due to lack of rehabilitation follow-through.
Security-first approach — Critics argue development takes a backseat to militarised response.
Poor implementation of FRA and PESA — The legal foundation for tribal rights is weak on the ground.
Ineffective police — Chhattisgarh Police vacancies high; corruption; many villages have zero police presence.
Complacency risk — With violence declining, central focus may shift before structural grievances are resolved.
UPSC Relevance
GS III (Internal Security) — LWE threat; role of external and internal state/non-state actors; state response.
GS I (Society) — Social empowerment of tribal communities, regional disparities.
GS II (Governance) — Land reforms, forest rights, PESA.
Essay — "Development is the best counter-insurgency; but counter-insurgency cannot replace development."
Key Takeaways
Naxalism began in Naxalbari (1967) and has since evolved through fragmentation, spread, and partial unification.
The movement is driven by structural grievances: land inequality, underdevelopment, tribal exploitation, weak state presence.
LWE has declined significantly from its 2010 peak but remains active in ~25-30 core districts (60%+ in Bastar, Chhattisgarh).
Government response combines security (Operation Green Hunt, CoBRA, surrender policy) and development (Aspirational Districts, FRAs, roads, telecom).
Structural issues — land rights, PESA implementation, tribal welfare — remain unresolved despite improved security metrics.
The endgame for LWE requires resolving the 'resource curse' — ensuring mining wealth benefits tribal communities directly.
Practice Question (250 words)
"Naxalism is not merely a law-and-order problem but a manifestation of deeper governance and developmental failures." Critically analyse with reference to the current status and government response.